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Abstract—In a shared radio access network, a user can be
served through the network of his home operator or the network
of another service operator in the sharing system. Consequently,
when the home operator is unable to serve its user, and there
is more than one available service operator, a selection decision
must be made. The decision must consider the satisfaction of
three main agents: the user, his home operator and the service
operator. In this paper, we adopt a strategic algorithm for the
access selection decision in a multi-operator wireless network. It
is based on a cost function that combines the requirements of the
user, its home operator profit and the offered QoS of the service
operator. This cost function takes into account the operators’
strategies for cooperation. We focus on the service operator
strategy and we propose two strategies: a pricing strategy that
consists of increasing the service cost, and a sharing strategy that
consists of limiting the amount of shared resources. Simulation
results prove the efficiency of the proposed algorithm and show
how sharing between operators brings benefits in terms of user
acceptance and profits as well. In addition, results show that
the service operator strategy affects the access selection decision
and the cooperation benefits; a pricing strategy can guarantee
high profits for the service operator and can improve its client
acceptance.
Index Terms—RAN sharing; radio access selection; cost func-
tion; resource sharing; service cost; operator strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
5G mobile technology promises innovation for entire mobile
industry [25], [3], [31]. It targets massive capacity and connec-
tivity in order to support an increasingly diverse set of services,
applications and users with extremely diverging requirements.
It aims for a flexible and efficient use of available radio
resources. Future mobile networks will adopt new solution
frameworks to accommodate both LTE and air interface
evolution, as Cloud, Software Defined Networks (SDN) and
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) technologies.
For operators, time and cost are crucial. Therefore, a rational
decision has to be done in order to hold on with the mobile
market evolution. And, since incomes are not growing with
the same rate as the traffic, new sources of revenues and
new cost reduction solutions are needed. RAN (Radio Access
Network) sharing is a rational approach that can help to
reduce costs, to maximize efficiency and competitiveness, and
to enhance customer satisfaction. It is introduced as a cost
effective solution to expand coverage and increase capacity in
[10], [12], [26]. It involves active sharing of RAN between two
or more operators as a mean of mutually offering access to
each other’s resources. This inter-operators arrangement brings
a lot of benefits for operators as CAPEX and OPEX savings,
new revenues achievements and energy consumption reduc-
tion. Besides, it promotes innovation since the competition
between operators, in such environment, is based on offered
services and features [26]. In fact, current 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) standards fully support network
sharing between operators under different sharing scenarios
as Multi-Operator Core Network (MOCN) and Gateway Core
Network (GWCN) [1].
Nowadays, a key factor for achieving infrastructure sharing
is the virtualization of physical entities by decoupling their
functionality from the hardware. Further, network densification
and small cell deployment are achievable through virtualiza-
tion; femtocells and picocells are created by Radio Remote
Heads (RRHs) instead of low power base stations (BSs) and
access points, and the infrastructure workload is computed at
the Base Band Processing Units (BBU), which can be shared
among different operators in the Cloud [9], [2], [29].
We consider a sharing system, where multiple operators
share their radio access in a multi-operator environment fig.1 .
In such system, mobile users can access BS of their home op-
erator or the BS of another operator of the sharing system. We
assume that the users are not free to access another operator BS
without the permission of their home operator. Indeed, when
the home operator of a user is unable to satisfy its constraints,
because of lack of resources or QoS, a transaction event is
triggered. It transfers the considered user to another operator,
in including an access selection decision in order to choose the
best operator for service. We assume that the access selection
decision is triggered and controlled by the home operator of
the transferred user. Furthermore, when a user is transferred,
its home operator must pay some service cost as cooperation
fees for the selected service operator. This transaction is
seamless to the user. Operators’ cooperation is unavoidable in
order to improve the global system performance and increase
operators’ profits. Moreover, such cooperation helps to avoid
the underutilization of radio resources when traffic level is
lower than planned, and QoS degradation when the traffic is
higher than expected.
We consider the strategies that a service operator may adopt
in a sharing system, in order to optimize the cooperation
benefits in terms of client acceptance and profits. For the
access selection decision, we introduce the S-AS (Strategic
Access Selection) algorithm based on our cost function NP-
BPA previously proposed and analyzed in [12], [15], [13]. It
Figure 1: Multi-operator environment
ensures the mobile user and its home operator satisfaction by
combining the requirements of the mobile user’s application,
the offered QoS from the radio access networks and the re-
sulting profit from the user transfer. The S-AS algorithm takes
into account the service operator strategy. It aims to prevent
overloading the network with guest users while maximizing its
revenue from sharing. We propose two strategies that consist
of controlling the announced service cost and the amount of
shared resources with other operators in the system.
The main contributions of this paper for multi-operator
sharing networks include:
1) The application of a strategic algorithm S-AS for the
access selection in multi-operator network. It is achieved
in two scenarios using: the open access mode, where the
operators share all their resources with guest users, and
the hybrid access mode, where the operators share only
a percentage of their resources.
2) The proposition of two strategies for the service operator
in order to maintain sharing benefits and network perfor-
mance. The first strategy, referred to the pricing strategy,
consists of increasing the service cost. And the second,
referred to the sharing strategy, consists of reducing the
amount of shared resources.
3) The comparison of the pricing and sharing strategy in
terms of the network performance and profits, to show
their effect on the cooperation benefits for all sharing
operators.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2
presents some existing work related to radio access selection
algorithms. Section 3 describes our decision algorithm and
highlights the expression of the operator’s strategies. Simula-
tion environment and results are presented in section 4. Finally,
section 5 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Access Selection was widely studied in heterogeneous
wireless networks managed by a single operator. Various
mathematical approaches that can be employed for access
selection are presented and evaluated in [39]. Access selection
tools include: utility and cost function used in [6], [28], [33],
[32], Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) methods
in [22], [24], [28], [27], [30], [41], [36], [37], Fuzzy Logic
in [20], [18], [41], Markov Chain in [35], [23] and Game
Theory in [4], [5], [7], [8], [34], [40]. In a cost function
based algorithm, decision parameters are normalized, assigned
a weight and then injected into a weighted sum to produce
a selection score. The decision parameters used for access
decision includes the bandwidth, BER, the delay, the jitter,
the price and latency, used with Linear or sigmoidal utility
functions.
In [20] author makes use of a methodology based on fuzzy-
neural systems in order to carry out a coordinated management
of the radio resources among the different access networks. In
[41], the author uses fuzzy logic to deal with imprecise criteria
and user preferences; data are first converted to numbers and
then classical Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM)
methods as Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) and Technique
for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS),
are applied. Another approach aims to prioritize the available
RATs to decide the optimum one for mobile users.
Such approach was applied in [36], using Grey Relational
Analysis (GRA), which aims to prioritize the networks for the
selection decision, after defining an ideal solution. Analytical
Hierarchy Process (AHP) was adopted to arrange the decision
parameters in three hierarchical levels, in order to calculate
the corresponding weighting factors. Another example of
combining GRA with AHP-based weighting is presented in
[39].
NPH approach, introduced in [28], consists of defining the
SAW score for the ideal solution, calculates the SAW score
for every candidate, and then computes the distances of each
candidate score to the ideal solution score. Finally, the access
network with the closest score to the ideal one is selected
for the service. The ideal solution score is the user’s SAW
score considering the QoS parameters required by the user’s
application. In [8], authors use AHP and GRA in order to
construct the payoff of requests and achieve network selection
using multi-round game.
In [37], a performance comparison was made between Mul-
tiplicative Exponent Weighting (MEW), SAW, TOPSIS and
GRA. Results showed similar performance to all traffic classes.
However, higher bandwidth and lower delay are provided by
GRA for interactive and background traffic classes. A network
centric approach is adopted in [38], to ensure load balancing,
while minimizing the costs of resource underutilization and
demand rejection.
In a multi-operator heterogeneous network, a new “flex
service” paradigm was introduced in [16]. It allows a mobile
user subscribed to “Flex service” to dynamically access base
stations (BSs) of different providers. Authors present two
modeling framework at both macroscopic and microscopic
levels. At a microscopic level, a flex user accesses dynamically
base station of different providers based on various criteria,
such as profile, network conditions and offered prices. In
our work, we envisage a similar multi-operator environment,
where a user can access the base station of a different provider.
However, our considered market is more open than “Flex
service” market, since a mobile user does not need any
previous subscription as a “Flex user”. Besides, the access
selection decision is controlled by the home operator; the user
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Table I: Comparison of Network Selection Techniques
is not free to switch between operators. At a macroscopic level,
the behavior of users is described by a population game in
order to determine how the entire user population reacts to
the decision of providers In fact, the majority of the existing
works, in multi-operator environment, use game theory for the
access selection and the joint service pricing.
In [7], authors applied a non-cooperative game that makes
use of Leader–follower model (Stackelberg game) in order to
study the competition between two ISPs. With a simple QoS
model, a Nash equilibrium point was found from which the
two ISPs would not move without cooperation.
Furthermore, a two-stage multi-leader-follower game is used
to model the interaction of a number of wireless providers and
a group of atomic users in [17]. The providers announce the
wireless resource prices in a first stage and the users announce
their demand for the resource in the second stage. The user’s
choice is based on provider’s prices and its channel conditions.
Authors showed that the provider competition leads to a unique
socially optimal resource allocation for a broad class of utility
functions and a generic channel model.
In [11], we modeled the interaction between wireless oper-
ators, in a multi-operator sharing network, as a multi-leader-
follower (Stackelberg) game. Cooperating service operators
announce their service cost in the first stage and the home
operator of the transferred user performs the selection decision
in the second stage. The game solution is found using Nash
equilibrium concept, and the best response is determine for
every pairs of leaders.
Another approach for Joint Radio Resource Management
(JRRM) is introduced in [19], [21]. Authors extended their
single operator approach to a cooperation scenario between
operators. They proposed a two-layer JRRM strategy to fully
exploit the available radio resource and to improve operator
revenue. The proposed economic-driven JRRM is based on
fuzzy neural methodology with different classes of input
parameters: technical inputs, economic inputs and operator
policies. Furthermore, a comparison between different access
selection techniques was made in [39], it shows the strong and
weak points of each techniques. We resume the comparison
results in Table I. We can point out on the implementation
simplicity of MADM and its high precision, in addition to
the high precision of game theory and its ability to fulfill
equilibrium between multiple entities.
In [15], [12], we exploited the advantages of MADM
techniques and especially the simplicity of SAW and NPH
to develop a hybrid decision algorithm, NP-BPA (Nearest
Performance and Best Profit Access Selection Algorithm), for
the access selection in a multi-operator network environment.
This algorithm seeks to minimize the distance between the user
application requirements and the offered QoS and to minimize
the user transfer profit, in the same time. SAW scoring is
used in two levels. In the first level, we specify the user and
available operators scores, than NPH is applied to form the
distance between the user application requirements and the
offered QoS. In the second level, the QoS distance and the
resulting profit from the user transfer are weighted and added
in a cost function. Simulation results showed the efficiency of
our decision algorithm in a three operators sharing network.
Moreover, the comparison of NP-BPA algorithm with SAW
and NPH was made in [13], simulation results showed that our
decision algorithm guarantees the lowest blocking probability
for all operators, it prevents overloading operator’s with high
numbers of guest users which affect own clients acceptance. In
addition, it improves global achieved profits for all cooperating
operators.
In this paper, our approach differs from previous works
by considering the open access mode, where the operators
share all their resources with guest users and the hybrid
access mode, where the operators share only a percentage
of their resources. In the hybrid access mode scenario, the
sharing operators decide the sharing factor γ. It represents
the percenatge of capacity to share with guest users coming
from another operator. Besides, for the access selection, the
decision cost function is reformulated into S-AS, in order to
take into account the service operator strategies . Further, this
work focuses on the satisfaction of the service operator, having
the highest capacity. It seeks the best strategy to adopt in
order to maximize the benefits from sharing. This operator
can decide to increase the service cost or decrease the amount
of shared resources independently of other operators, in order
to maintain better performance and higher profits.
III. ACCESS SELECTION ALGORITHM
We consider a system formed by a number of operators
who decided to cooperate and share their RAN in order to
ensure end users satisfaction and improve their revenues. We
assume that the adopted selection algorithm is identical for all
operators in the system and it is maintained and processed in
a suitable unit guaranteeing a correct decision. A Coordinated
Radio Resource Management (CRRM) is expected to be ap-
plied and a third trusty party is integrated in order to maintain
and guarantee the inter-operators agreements especially for the
transaction cost pricing. The user transfer to a new service
operator, denoted by S-op, is triggered and controlled by its
home operator, denoted by H-op. Therefore, when a user
arrives in the system and his H-op cannot admit it neither
ensure QoS requirements for his application, it is transferred
to another cooperating operator to avoid his rejection. The
system logic is represented in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: System Logic
The selection decision takes into account different pa-
rameters that could be collected from the user application
requirements, the user profile and preferences, the available
operators’ access networks, the user handset, etc. The con-
sidered parameters differ with the context and the selection
objectives, for example, when the selection decision seeks
the user satisfaction in terms of QoS, parameters as the
throughput, delay, BER must be considered to satisfy the user
application requirements. In our model we consider the offered
bandwidth as the QoS decision parameter.
In addition, when the user has limited budget for the
service access, the service price of the new S-op has to
be considered. Besides, the user preferences are difficult to
specify and depend strongly on the willingness of the user
to pay. Moreover, the access selection decision must consider
the operator satisfaction, precisely the H-op of the transferred
user. In fact, in our model the user does not pay any additional
fees for the service, its payment goes to its H-op respecting the
contract between them. The H-op has to pay the cooperation
fees, i.e, the service cost ct, to the service operator. Hence, the
H-op looks to minimize this cost, and to apply its own strategy
for the user transfer. We define the strategy of an operator as
the determination to consider user satisfaction as a top priority
to prevent any churn risk, or to ensure an acceptable QoS for
its client while maximizing its profits. This strategy can be
expressed explicitly in our cost function using two coefficients
for the degree of importance of the user satisfaction and of the
operator service costs.
Consequently, when a transaction event is triggered, the
offered bandwidth and ct of the available S-op must be
available, quantified and injected in a cost function. Each
available S-op will be qualified by its cost function, and then
the selection decision is made. Figure 3 resumes the required
parameters for the selection decision algorithm.
Figure 3: Decision parameters
A. Decision Cost Function
The selection candidates are the partners capable of offering
the best QoS for the user, with the highest profit. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we describe briefly the SAW scoring and
NPH approach for the selection decision, then we introduce
our selection cost function.
1) Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) : With SAW, the
parameters collected from each available access network, are
normalized and combined with the corresponding sensitivity
weights, then added to form the access network score [37].
The access network having the highest score will be selected
for the user service. In [28], [36], four QoS parameters are
considered: the mean jitter JM, the mean end-to-end delay DM,
the remaining bandwidth BWM and the mean loss rate BERM.
In a multi-operator environment the access network is repre-
sented by its operator. Therefore, using the QoS parameters
mentioned above, the score of the ith service operator may be
calculated as follows:
SSAWi =wJ ·JMi+wD·DMi+wBW ·BWRi+wBER·BERMi (1)
where wJ , wD, wBW , and wBER are the user application
sensitivity weights for the jitter, the end-to-end delay, the
bandwidth and the BER, respectively.
2) Nearest Performance Handover (NPH) : The NPH ap-
proach is initially proposed in a single operator context [28]
and can be used in our multi-operator environment, where
each operator manages a single access network. It consists
of defining the SAW score for the ideal solution, calculates
the SAW score for every candidate, and then computes the
distances of each candidate score to the ideal solution score.
Finally, the access network with the closest score to the ideal
one is selected for the service. The ideal solution score is the
user’s SAW score considering the QoS parameters required by
the user’s application. In order to adapt the NPH approach to
our model, we proposed in [13] to add the user budget p to
its score, and the service price to the score to each service
operator. Hence, the score of the user, Su, is computed as
follows:
Su=η·(wJ ·Jreq+wD·Dreq+wBW ·BWreq+wBER·BERreq)+θ·p (2)
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where, Jreq, Dreq, BWreq and BERreq are the required
jitter, delay, bandwidth and BER respectively, for user’s appli-
cation. These parameters are determined from the application
QoS class, normalized and associated to their corresponding
weights wJ , wD, wBW and wBER , respectively. In addition,
η and θ are the preference coefficients of the user for the QoS
and the paid price, respectively. Symmetrically, the new score
for the ith service operator, S
′SAW
i , is calculated as follows:
S
′SAW
i =η·(wJ ·JMi+wD·DMi+wBW ·BWRi+wBER·BERMi )+θ·pi
(3)
where, pi is the service price of the ith operator set for
its clients. Finally, the score of the ith service operator is
calculated as follows:
SNPHi = |Su − S
′SAW
i | (4)
Consequently, the operator delivering enough QoS parameters
for user’s application requirements, thus having the lowest
SNPHi is selected for the service.
3) Strategic Access Selection Algorithm (S-AS): In our pro-
posed algorithm, we consider the H-op happiness during the
selection decision, thus, we use the service cost cti as a decision
parameters. Besides, considering the second strategy of the S-
op, we use the remaining of the shared bandwidth sBWRi
as the offered QoS parameters. In fact, sBWi = γi.BWi
where, BWi is the total capacity of S-opi , γi is the resource
sharing factor and sBWi is the total bandwidth shared with
other operators. Hence, [cti, γi] represents the strategy of S-opi.
Based on SAW scoring and NPH distance, the SS−ASi score
of the ithS-op, forming the cost function for the user transfer
is calculated as follows:
SS−ASi = gu · |BWreq − sBWRi | − go.(p− c
t
i) (5)
where, go and gu are the sensitivity weights for the service
cost and QoS, respectively, and gogu quatifies the H-op strategy.
The selected S-op is the one having the lowest SS−ASi , thus
minimizing the service cost and maximizing the offered QoS
parameters.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
The performance evaluation of our selection algorithm S-SA
consists of showing the network performance enhancement in
terms of blocking rates and the improvement of the global
achieved profits, after cooperation. We consider a system
formed by three operators, where each operator manages a
single radio access network.
We start our analysis by the open access mode sce-
nario, where all operators adopt the same strategy [cti, γi] =
[pi, 1] ∀i, i.e, all operators set a service cost equal to their
service price pi, and they share all their capacity. We show the
efficiency of our selection algorithm and the benefits of sharing
between operators in terms of user acceptance and profits.
Next, we consider the strategic sharing mode: first we apply
the pricing strategy and second we apply the sharing strategy.
Finally, we compare the pricing and the sharing strategies and
we focus on the advantages of each strategy for the operator
with the highest capacity.
We model the arrival and departure of users as a Poisson
Process with mean arrival interval 1/λ sec. Once connected,
the user will stay in the system for a service time, assumed to
follow an exponential distribution of mean 1/µ; we consider
a typical value of 1/µ = 4min [36] . At the end of the
connection, the user will leave the system thus, improving the
available bandwidth of the serving operator. The simulation is
implemented in MATLAB, and the results are given with a
confidence interval of 95%.
A. Open access mode analysis
In this subsection, we consider the sharing system formed
by the three operators Op1, Op2 and Op3. All operators
agree to share all their capacity in an open access mode, and
we implement our selection algorithm, S-AS. We simulate
our scenario using the values 1700, 11000, 5500 kbytes/s
for the capacities of Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively. For
the service price p, we use the following values: p1 =
0.9, p2 = 0.1 and p3 = 0.2 unit/kbytes, for Op1, Op2
and Op3, respectively. In addition, we use the values 1/λ =
2.7, 3, 3.33, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 24 sec for the mean inter-arrival
interval. The performance analysis in terms of blocking rates
and profits improvement is made for a value of gugo = 1, in
equation 5.
1) Global performance:: The global performance of the
system is studied in terms of global blocking rates. Figure 4
presents the global blocking rates of the system in function
of the arrival rates λ. It shows an excellent reduction in the
blocking rates, about 95%, when the three operators cooperate.
These rates are maintained below 0.5% at low and medium
arrival rates.
2) Network performance: : Figures 5a, 5b and 5c show
a comparison between the blocking rates, with and without
cooperation, for Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively. Op1, sharing
the lowest capacity, is taking the largest benefit from this
cooperation. Its blocking probability is reduced up to 78%
(Fig. 5a), clients are transferred to Op2 and Op3 instead of
being blocked. In addition, Op3 sharing a medium capacity,
has reduced also its blocking percentage after cooperation (Fig.
5c). And Op2, sharing the highest capacity, could maintain
the blocking percentage below 0.3% at low arrival rates. But
at high arrival rates, this operator was penalized by a high
number of guest users, which increased its blocking rates.
3) Operators’ profit improvement: : Figures 6a, 6b and 6c
show the global achieved profits in function of the arrival rates,
for Op1, Op2 and Op3 , respectively. Comparing the achieved
values with cooperation and those without cooperation, one
can see that the operators of the sharing system could realize
important profit gains through cooperation. Our selection
algorithm could guarantee the satisfaction of the operators
transferring their users by selecting the S-op with lower costs.
We can see that the increase of the users’ acceptance after
cooperation, brought more incomes for Op1; clients are trans-
ferred to another serving operators instead of being blocked
and loosing their payments (Fig. 6a). Op3 also benefits from
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Figure 4: Global blocking rates in the open access mode
Table II: Op2’s Serving rates (%)
Serving rates (%)
Arrival rates λ 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.33 0.37
Guest percentages 35 35 37 43 45 48 48 50
profit improvement (Fig. 6c). Extra incomes have risen after
cooperation, because of the increase of users’ acceptance and
the service of guest users. For Op2, profit gains are achieved,
although the increase of the rejection at high arrival rates. In
fact, high rate of guest user are served at high arrival rates
insuring additional incomes. A further study of the serving
rates of Op2 (percentage of served guest users from total
served users) in table II, has revealed that more than 35 %
of the served users are guest users. This did not improve the
profits of Op2 since its service cost is set equal to its price
([ct2, γ2] = [p2, 1]), but the impact was clear on the client
acceptance.
B. Strategic sharing mode analysis
Previous results showed that Op2, sharing the highest ca-
pacity, is penalized with an increase of the blocking rates at
high arrival rates. In fact, at high arrival rates, the served guest
percentages are very high affecting Op2’s client acceptance.
In this subsection, we apply the pricing and sharing strategies
in order to improve the blocking rates of Op2 and improve its
profit. First, we apply the pricing strategy, and we propose that
Op2 increases its service cost ct, while sharing all its capacity.
It will affect the number of guest users, since the service cost is
a parameters in the selection decision cost function in equation
5. Then, we apply the sharing strategy, and we propose that
Op2 reduces the amount of shared capacity, while keeping a
service cost equal to its price c2t = p2.
1) Application of the pricing strategy: Consider the sharing
system formed by the three operators Op1, Op2 and Op3.
These operators share all their capacities and set different
service prices p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.1 and p3 = 0.2 unit/kbytes,
respectively. Using the service cost pricing scenarios proposed
in [14], we will compare the following scenarios:
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Figure 5: Operators’ network blocking rates in the open access
mode
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Figure 6: Operators’ Global Achieved Profits in the open
access mode
1) Scenario 1: The operators, Op1, Op2 and Op3, adopt
ACAG (As Client As Guests) as a pricing scenario [14],
such that each operator sets a service cost equal to
its service price. Accordingly, the strategy vectors are
[ct1, γ1] = [0.9, 1], [c
t
2, γ2] = [0.1, 1] and [c
t
3, γ3] =
[0.2, 1] for Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively. This sce-
nario will be reffered to the open access mode in the
rest of the paper.
2) Scenario 2: Op2 chooses to set the highest service cost in
the system, while Op1 and Op3 adopt ACAG, with strat-
egy vectors, [ct1, γ1] = [0.9, 1] and [c
t
3, γ3] = [0.2, 1],
respectively. Indeed, Op2 adopts MIWC (Max In When
Cooperating) as a pricing scenario [14], and it sets a
service cost equal to the highest service price in the
group, such as [ct2, γ2] = [0.9, 1].
3) Sceanrio 3: All operators adopt MIWC and set their
service cost to the highest service price in the group
such as , [ct1, γ1] = [0.9, 1], [c
t
2, γ2] = [0.9, 1] and
[ct3, γ3] = [0.9, 1], for Op1, Op2 and Op3 respectively.
a) Blocking rate variation: Figures 7a, 7b and 7c show
the blocking rates of Op1, Op2 and Op3 respectively, for
the different scenarios and the non cooperation case. For all
considered operators, the best values of the blocking rates
are achieved with scenario 2 where Op2 adopts MIWC and
sets its service cost to the highest service price in the group,
while Op1 and Op3 adopt ACAG by setting their service
cost to their service price p. In other words, the best pricing
strategy for Op2 is to set a high service cost, at least equal to
the highest service price adopted in the sharing system. This
strategy guarantee the lowest blocking rates for Op2 and all
other operators. Hence, comparing to the open access mode
in scenario1, adopting a pricing strategy have improved the
client acceptance of the operator sharing the highest capacity
and all other sharing operators.
b) Profit variation: Figures 8a, 8b and 8c show the global
achieved profits, for Op1, Op2 and Op3 respectively, for the
different scenarios and the non cooperation case. Op2 and
Op3 achieve the highest profits when Op2 adopts the strategy
of scenario 2. But, for Op1 the scenario 1 guarantees better
profits. In fact, with scenario 1, Op2 and Op3 set a low service
cost, and since Op1 performs a high number of transactions
to improve its client acceptance, this scenario guarantees the
lowest cost, thus, better profits. However, scenario 2 comes
in the second place. In fact, Op1 transfers the majority of its
client to Op2 , which sets a high service cost in this scenario.
Again, adopting a pricing strategy, with a high service cost,
guarantees the best profits for Op2 and the operator sharing
high to medium capacity. Besides, it achieves good profit
improvements for the operators with limited capacity.
2) Application of the sharing strategy: In this subsection,
Op2 will apply its sharing strategy and will reduce the amount
of shared capacity from 100% to γ2 = 50, 30, 10%, keeping
the same service cost 0.2 units/kbytes. We assume that Op2
changes its sharing factor, while other operators share all their
capacity with a sharing factor γ1 = γ3 = 100%.
a) Blocking rate variation: Figures 9a , 9b and 9c show
the blocking rates of Op1, Op2 and Op3 respectively, for the
different sharing strategies of Op2 and the non cooperation
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Figure 7: Blocking rate variation with the pricing strategy
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case. Previous results (see fig. 5b) showed that, when Op2
shares all its capacity in an open access mode (with γ2 =
100%), it was penalized by a high number of guest users,
which increased its blocking rates. When this operator changes
its sharing strategy and reduces the amount of shared capacity,
its blocking rates are improved fig. 9b. For low arrival rates
below 0.2, the blocking rates of Op2 with different γ are null.
These rates increase with the system arrival rate, i.e. when the
system becomes more loaded, and are higher when Op2 shares
more capacity. They are maintained below 1% with γ2 = 10%.
Reducing the amount of shared capacity helped Op2 to limit
the guest flow and guarantee its clients satisfaction. However,
the blocking rates of Op1 and Op3 increase when Op2 reduces
the shared capacity, since it reduces the acceptance of guest
users coming from these operators.
Hence, changing the sharing strategy improves the client
acceptance of Op2, but affects the clients satisfaction of other
operators in the sharing system. The blocking rates of other
operators, having smaller capacity and performing a lot of
transactions, increase when Op2 reduces the amount of shared
capacity.
b) Profit variation: Figures 10a, 10b and 10c show the
global achieved profits, for Op1, Op2 and Op3 respectively,
for the different sharing strategies and the non cooperation
case. First, one can see that when Op2 reduces the amount of
shared resources, the achieved profits of all sharing operators
decreases.
In fact, the revenue of Op1 with the lowest capacity, depends
strongly on the payment of the transferred users. Therefore,
when Op2 adopts a low sharing factor γ2, the user blockings
of Op1 increase, thus, reducing its profits fig. 10a. For Op2,
sharing the highest capacity, the profit improvement depends
strongly on the service cost gained from serving guest users.
Therefore, when it reduces the sharing factor γ2, Op2 serves
less guest users and the achieved profits decrease fig. 10b. Op3,
sharing a medium capacity, serves guest users coming from
Op1 at low and medium arrival rates, and transfers its clients
to Op2, at high arrival rates. Thus, the profit improvement of
Op3 depends on the service cost gained from Op1 and the
income from transferred users at high arrival rates. Therefore,
at low and medium arrival rates, Op3 achieves the same profits
whatever is the sharing strategy of Op2 fig.10c. But, at high
arrival rates, when Op2 reduces its sharing factor γ2, Op3 is
unable to transfer its clients for more incomes, which reduces
its profits.
Hence, the sharing strategy of Op2, does not affect the profit
improvement at low and medium arrival rates. But, when the
system is very loaded, at high arrival rates, the profits of all
operators of the sharing system decrease with γ2.
C. Strategy Comparison
In this subsection, we will compare the best pricing strategy
of Op2, that consist of setting the highest service cost in the
system, and the best sharing strategy (considering the blocking
rate improvement), that consists of reducing the amount of
shared capacity. We will highlight the advantages for Op2
when applying each of these strategies and how it effects the
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network performance and profits of other sharing operators.
For this objective, we will compare three scenarios:
1) The first scenario referred to the open access mode, with
strategy vectors [ct1, γ1] = [0.9, 1], [c
t
2, γ2] = [0.1, 1]
and [ct3, γ3] = [0.2, 1] for Op1, Op2 and Op3, respec-
tively.
2) In the second scenario, Op2 applies its pricing strategy,
with a strategy vectors [ct1, γ1] = [0.9, 1], [c
t
2, γ2] =
[0.9, 1] and [ct3, γ3] = [0.2, 1] for Op1, Op2 and Op3,
respectively.
3) In the second scenario, Op2 applies its sharing strategy
with γ2 = 10% , with strategy vectors [ct1, γ1] = [0.9, 1],
[ct2, γ2] = [0.1, 0.1] and [c
t
3, γ3] = [0.2, 1] for Op1, Op2
and Op3, respectively.
1) Blocking rate variation: Figures 11a, 11b and 11c shows
the blocking rates for Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively, for
different strategies of Op2.
Notice that, when the system became very loaded, at high
arrival rate in fig. 11b, Op2 could guarantee the lowest
blocking rates and thus the best client acceptance by adopting a
sharing startegy, i.e, by limiting the amount of shared capacity.
Moreover, with the pricing strategy the blocking rates are
higher, however, they still in an acceptable range for such
system state and are better than the blocking rates in an open
access mode. For Op1 and Op3, the lowest blocking rates are
achieved when Op2 adopts the pricing strategy figures 11a
and 11c, respectively, and the open access mode comes in the
second place.
2) Profit variation: Figures 12a, 12b and 12c show the
global profits for Op1, Op2 and Op3, respectively, for different
strategies of Op2.
For Op2, fig. 12b, the pricing strategy guarantees the highest
profits; with this strategy Op2 achieve the highest income
from guest users. It is the same for Op3. In fact when Op2
applied the pricing strategy a number of guest users from
Op1 are transferred to Op3, which added new incomes to this
operator. For Op1, with the lowest capacity, a high number
of transaction are needed to improve the client acceptance,
hence, the open access mode guarantees its users service with
the lowest service cost, thus with the best profits.
Hence, the operator with the highest capacity guarantees
the lowest blocking rates when adopting a sharing strategy.
However, it affects the client acceptance of other partners
and reduces the achieved profits. With the pricing strategy,
the blocking rates of such operator are higher, but in an
acceptable range, and the blocking rates of other partners
are the lowest. With this strategy, operators sharing high and
moderate capacities guarantee the best profits.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a strategic selection algorithm
S-AS for the access selection in a multi-operator sharing
network. This algorithm guarantees the user and its home
operator satisfaction, simultaneously, and the service operator
is able to express its own strategy. The efficiency of this
algorithm was shown in a sharing system formed by three
operators, where we have proved the benefits of cooperation
in terms of network performance and achieved profits.
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Figure 11: Operators’ blocking rate with strategy comparison
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Further, we concluded that the operator sharing the highest
capacity may be penalized by a high number of guest users,
which affect its clients acceptance. Such operator should adopt
some strategy in order to maintain its client satisfaction and
profits as well. One strategy consits of choosing the highest
service cost to control the guests flow and to induce additional
incomes. Results showed that, when the operator sharing the
highest capacity adopts the pricing strategy, it has improved a
lot the blocking rates. Besides, it guaranteed the lowest rates
for other sharing operators. Moreover, it has improved the
profits for all operators sharing high and moderate capacities.
Another strategy is to limit the amount of shared resource with
guests. With this strategy, the operator with the highest capac-
ity, improved very well its blocking rates, but has increased
the blocking rates of other sharing operators. Further, results
showed that more this operator shares capacity, more profits
are guaranteed for all partners.
Consequently, the benefits of sharing depends on the strat-
egy of the operators, how much they share of their capacity
and they set the service cost. Futur work will investigate the
best sharing factor and service cost, considering the strategies
of all operators. The interaction between the operators of the
sharing system can be modeled using game theory.
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